Once you have access to a good internet connection again, you can upload your previously gathered content.
That way, gathering evidence in the field, in rural areas, at sea, in space, or even close to home if you have limited or no internet is still possible. You can use the app offline during the collection process and only need an internet connection when you are ready to upload your learning evidence to your Mahara site. Mahara Mobile is an app that allows you to collect your learning evidence on your handheld device to easily upload it into Mahara. Mahara Mobile is available in the Android App Store for Android 8.1 or later and in the Apple Store for iOS devices. the use of the visual editor.Īll themes in Mahara are responsive. Furthermore, certain functionality is not available on a mobile device if it does not allow for it, e.g.
The purpose is to provide the best viewing experience on any device, but in particular mobile devices.
Mit einen Android-Smartphone oder iPad können Sie Dateien direkt vom Endgerät nach Mahara hochladen. Depending on the device, not all functions may be available to you. Because drivers have reaped less advantage from these alignments, labor issues have been taken up in judicial venues, again primarily by surrogates (usually plaintiffs’ attorneys) but to date have not been successful.You can use Mahara to a certain degree from a mobile device such as a smartphone or tablet that has internet browser capabilities. In its surrogate capacity in city and state regulation, Uber has frequently mobilized large numbers of customers and drivers to lobby for policy outcomes that allow it to continue to provide service on terms it finds acceptable. It is further characterized by the surrogate representation of dispersed actors-customers and drivers-who do not have autonomous power and who rely instead on shifting alignments with the challenger and incumbent. In the case of Uber, disruptive regulation takes the form of challenger capture, an elite-driven pattern, in which the challenger has largely prevailed. Second, the politics of subsequently regulating the challenger leads to a dual regulatory regime. First, an existing regulatory regime is not deregulated but successfully disregarded by a new entrant.
We describe instead a pattern of “disruptive regulation”, characterized by a challenger-incumbent cleavage, in two steps. We find that the politics of Uber regulation does not conform to existing models of regulation. We examine Uber in the United States as a case of regulating this disruption in different arenas: cities, state legislatures, and judicial venues. Platform companies disrupt not only the economic sectors they enter, but also the regulatory regimes that govern those sectors.
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